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1\xtists9 Workers, and the Lavv of ¥0ork � 
Keynote Addres§ 
HOWARD LESNICK 
I 
can best open what I want to sav by beginning as I do in mv course in 
Law and a Market Economy . wtth a storv attnbuted to Ptcasso. In hts 
Cubist period, he was painting a picture of a woman. One day when the 
work was almost finished, the woman's husband dropped by the studio to 
drive her home. Picasso showed him the picture and said, "Well, what do 
vou think?" The husband said it was really verv nice, but it didn't look 
anything like his wife. \A/hereupon Picasso said, "\A/ell, what does your 
wife look like'!" (His wife was sitting there all the tirne. ) The husband 
reached into his wallet. took out a photograph. and handed it to Picasso, 
saying "That's what she looks like . "  Picasso examined the picture for a 
long time, then gave it back to the husband and said , "I didn't realize she 
was so small.'' 
Now when I talk to law students. who are a notoriously unimaginative 
and literal-minded bunch, I go on to explain the story as only a notoriously 
unimaginati\'e and literal-minded person would trv w do; in the company 
of artists and their camp followers , I sh rink from doing that. What I take 
the story to be saying is that our perceptions of realitv are embedded in 
unspoken premises-such as, a photograph is not a lifesize representation 
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but is otherwise lifelike. Of course, even that statement is not literally true 
either, when t he p hotograph is not in color or the color is known to corre­
spond only slightly to what our eyes see. 
More broadly, our perception of reality is a social construct. I t  is not 
surprising that artists should be one profession, probably the fi rst , to realize 
the truth of that concept; but it is important for you t o  realize, whether you 
are a lawyer or not, that such a perception is not only true of the arts, but is 
true of the law. And it is true of the world around us; the way we see the 
vvorld is a social construct. I t  is the way we view reality; much of what we 
think of as simply a description of reality is also a social construct. That is 
not to say it's wrong, not to say it is an illusion or delusion. It's something 
more complex. 
vVhat I want to talk about is what I refer to as the notion of a con­
sciousness of work. There has been in our society for the last couple of hun­
dred vears a consciousness of work-I call it the prevailing consciousness­
which has had an enormous impact on the way \Ve think about work and on 
the \\·av the law of work has e\·olved. There is also an alternative conscious­
ness of work, a different way of looking at it. It is interesting to think about 
this idea in the context of the arts. It is obvious that in many ways the ar­
tistic professions are the home of that alternative consciousness. I will say 
more about that in a moment, but I first want to spell out what I mean by a 
consciousness of \vork: an entire set of mutually reinforcing premises, 
priorities, and perceptions that answer the question, "vVhat do people do 
when thcv work.)" We have a set of answers to those questions that some­
times is largely implicit: thev are not stated or are sometimes stated as if 
they are self-e\·ident, as simply a description of reality. This room is rec­
tangular: that is a picture of a beach; the lights are on. Those perceptions 
are not \·iewed as social constructs. Thev are viewed as simple descriptions 
of fact. 
VVhat is the prevailing consciousness of work0 In tvvo words, it is that 
work is an exchange relation. It's a contract. It is the giving up of leisure in 
exchange for something else. Economists say, of course, that leisure is a 
good thing: vou give up leisure, you \VOrk, and vou get something back. 
Thar is a short ans,,er that has an awful lot riding with it. A number of 
things llO\\ from that view. I don't want to dwell on all of them, but let me 
mention SC\'Cral. Most important, of course, is that such an analogy quickly 
unites the \\·ork relation to our traditional notions of contract and exchange, 
both in ]a,,· and in our ideologv generallv. It is a voluntary , bilateral rela­
tion. There is no right to \\·ork. There is no right to a job; there's simply a 
right, ih·ou will, to look for one. Iviore salient, perhaps, is the idea that the 
utilicv of '::hat a .,_, orker does is external to the worker. Utili tv is largelv 
defined bv the user. initiallv the e mployer- will somebody hire vou"!-anc! 
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ultimately society because the employer is typically hiring you in order to 
sell something that you helped make or do. So I can imagine myself a basso 
profunda, but nobody credits that unless somebody's willing to pay me to 
sing. The same thing goes for being a lavvyer, a waiter, a cab driver, or any­
thing else. The utility of what you do is external to you. 
In this paradigm the value of what you do to yourself, the meaning of 
vour work, is that it is a means to self-sufficiency. That is what you get 
back. You get back an income that (one hopes) can support life. You get 
back whatever status comes with the job. That again, I think, is a decep­
tively simple set of statements that has an enormous hold on our percep­
tions, and that legitimates and de-legitimates an awful lot of things Vie 
struggle about. So, for example, a corrolary suggests that what you put into 
your job, what is your business and what is not, is defined by the notion of 
role. Certainly lawyers, who you might think of as professionals or in some 
sense as artists, are very much a part of that paradigm-as a lawyer I have 
a certain job, to be loyal to my client, to be skeptical. The idea is endemic; 
it is true of all jobs. The role that you have is not defined by you, except in 
the sense that you took the job. In the legal sense vou took it voluntarily: 
you might have been delighted; it might be a wonderful job; you might feel 
you are being overpaid or overvalued; it might be a terrible job; you might 
feel you are being exploited; you might have had six choices; vou might 
have been unemployed for a year. In some sense those factors all matter, 
but thev do not change the fact that once vou take the job, the role is de­
fined for you by the job and initially bv the employer. 
There is a wonderful case that illustrates all of this. It is one of the deci­
sions that has been corning along in the last ten years, attempting to limit 
the employer's power to discharge emplovees at will where there is no col­
lective bargaining agreement. The cast: invoked a salesman who sold steel 
products and who thought that a new product \vas unsafe. He told his boss, 
"You know, I don't think it's really a good product. You shouldn't sell it." 
The boss said, "Don't worry, the engineers have cleared it." which they 
had. Still the salesman was troubled. He didn ' t call Ralph Nader: he didn't 
go to the newspapers. He vvent to the vice president of the company, vvho 
happened to be his personal friend, and told him, "You knm,v, you really 
ought to look into this. I think thev made a mistake." So the company 
looked into it, and they found the statesmanlike personnel solution. They 
recalled the product and fired the salesman. 
He brought a suit, vvhich had no statutorv basis, and he argued the ob­
vious point-that there is a strong public policy in safetv, in not letting 
employers fire people for pressing this kind of complaint. The court's 
answer was this: 
Certainly the potential for abuc'e of an employer's power of dismissal is par-
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ticularly serious when an employee must exercise independent expert judg­
ment. But Geary does not hold himself out as this sort of emplovee. He was in­
volved onl\' in the sale of products. Ther·e is no suggestion that he possessed 
any expert qualifications or that his duties extended to making judgments in 
matters of product safe tv. 
In other vvords, as evervone knovvs, if you're a salesman, you are supposed 
to say hmv great the product is, not how bad it is. He wasn't an engineer; 
he wasn't a safety person. If he cared about safety-whether because he 
cared about the company's reputation, his own reputation, or what hap­
pened to other people, or just because he cared-that was his own business. 
He could do whatever he wanted about that on his own time. He could 
write a book. or he could look for another job. But it was not part of his job. 
VVhv not? Because the job was not defined to include caring about safety. 
The case is a good example of an endemic attribute of the prevailing 
notion about work. It illustrates for us that personal qualities, including 
your own values, your own priorities, in a \·erv reai sense vourself, are a 
frill. Those things are not a legitimate input to vour _job, vour ernplovabil­
itv. or what vou do in your job. 
There are other contexts illustrating this point. An ex::m1ple is the so­
called "lifestvlc" case in which men with long hair or beards or women 
with pants are not hired unless thev conform to a norm. The prn·ailing 
viev,· of work savs "If vou want thejob. cut vou r hair. If vou don't \van t to 
cur �·:our hair, that'3 okay. but vou 're not entiried co bring that part of vou 
in. It is not part of rhe job. '' The same is true about personal values. Again, 
the prevailing \·iew holds that if YOU don't ''ant to tal·J' a job, vou don't 
ha'.-e to, but vour personal values are nor a legitimate part of the job. 
One of the prm,ocatil'e things that Theodore Bi!-:el said this morning 
''-'as chat wc�etl' �-�ews actors as m some wav disrcpu table; that acting is not 
ack:1owkdged as propei· 1vork: and that actors are thought to lead lives of 
:otbandon, for \l·hich thev hcl\·e to paY more for insuranu:'. One reason his 
observa.tion i�� true, --.vhy actors are tho�.Jght of 21.s e�sentia_lly ��elf-indulgent 
people, is that they a.re '.vorking at so1nething because they like it or think 
chat it is importam, not because somebodv is ··xilling to hire rhem. This is 
not to sa'-· that the\' don't care. because thev orwiousl\· ha1·e to care about ' . 
gettir:g hired. But rhere is a sense in \vhich it's a personal quaiit\· that leads 
vcu to want to ctct. And, in the dorninant paradigm. thcu qualitv is not con­
sidcr�d terribh· relevant. 
/-\ny beginning ac:tor confronts that attitude. -:{our parents tell you, 
'· \. ou · ll gro\v up, forget this acting business, and sell i nsu ranee like the rest 
afus. Or ar·:: \'OU going w be a kid all your life?'' There is a. moral ducv to 
ln;::dze �:ourse1fernployable. Ifan:\rthing .tnight k�·c:p you f(iJilJ getting ajob­
;,vhethcr it's ty·ping your resurne \Vithout blotting the paper 'Nhen you sign 
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your name, not shaving, or whatever (all the Horatio Alger stuff)-you do 
it. More importantly, this attitude shapes your own goals in life and soci­
ety. You want to be valued in the world, and it is basically a deal. I make 
\\·idgets, people buy widgets, they pav me; everyone feels happy. It may be 
ad\·antageous to vou, it may be advantageous to society, or disadvan­
tageous to both. But it is essentially a transaction. 
I believe that these ideas are mutually reinforcing, that they flow from 
the basic view of work as an exchange relation, and that they have an enor­
mous impact on what we think of as legitimate and illegitimate. And thev 
are a social construct. 
Now as I said. there is an alternati\·e consciousness. I don't mean by 
that term to say that the traditional consciousness is not true. Obviouslv, 
there is an exchange elemenr to work. But it is not the whole story. Again, 
there is no need to chvell on the idea before this group. because in many 
ways the vvhole notion of being an artist is that you are not "giving up" 
something bv working, for which your pav compensates vou. This morn­
ing, a dancer, speaking of her company, said "I had to give up dancing." 
An economist would sav, "No, no, vou ··.v e re able to give up dancing. You 
became a boss, and you didn't have to dance." \Nhen she worked, she did 
so from an alternati,:e consciousness of \'iork. The central idea of that con­
sciousness is that part of \Our be ing a person is bound up with \vanting to 
work, with \vanting robe useful, \\'ith wanting to express vour energy, your 
creativitv, vour CCJnnec:tion to other people . It ne\·er suffices to describe 
your work as giving up somethin g to get something back. You are also ex­
pressing something that is important to vou. 
It foilows that the utilitv of what vou do is defined internallv as well as 
externallv. 'vVh<H that thought immecliatelv conjures up is the bad musician 
hanging out in vVashingron Square Park, plaving the saxophone, and 
answering his father's complaint, "\Nlw don't vou get a job?" with, ''I'm 
a music i an : people drop monev in mv bo:�." That example sees t!1e ques­
tion in polar terms: either societv defines utili tv, or its judgment is irrele­
vant. The real question. as I see it, is more complex: hmv can vou follov,· 
your \\·ork, \vhich has sc1f-Yalidated n1eaning and usefulness to youJ in a 
situation 1vhere vou ha\·e to get external validation too? The external 
validation is :wt unimporwnt and not irrelevant, but it is not the whole 
storv because the u(ilitv of \vhat vou do is not defined by people's will­
ingness to pav for it. Peopl'-" 's IY illingne ss to pav for it may be a necesso.rv 
requisite to vour being able to continue to do it. Still, that self-validating 
aspect is regarded as legitimate. 
This rnorning sorn.eone spoke ?..bout moving tovva!�d exc(:llencc, rTlO"i­
ing to•lv"ard a corr1rnitrnent to exceJ.lence. In the traditioncJ paradigrr1, ho��v 
do you kno\"i v1ho is .e��cellenr and \vho is not? YVhether it is a painting or 
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steel rails, the ans·wer is that what people buy, what people will pay for, is 
excellent, and what people won't pay for is junk. As artists you reject that , 
and there is an urge in all of us to reject that. You say that you have some 
sense that you can define excellence and hold on to it. It is slippery as every­
body knows, but the notion involves a concept of intrinsic value not defined 
by the market. And you avert that you can act out of it that awareness. A 
worker's interest in his or her work is in part an extension of that person's 
identity. It goes bevond what people will pay for. 
So when the panelists spoke about regional theatre and the notion of 
an ensemble, it was to suggest a value in working together. What is the 
basis of that value? vVhen I was in college, certain schools played good 
basketball because the players grew up in the same neighborhood and 
played together for ten years so they could beat the hell out of everyone 
else. That suggests one reason why it is important to work together. But 
,,, hat I heard at this morning's panel was something that went beyond that. 
Wholly apart from the commodity value of ensembles is another value­
acting communally and being involved with people you care about, having 
iess dissonance between home life and work life. And all of that rests on the 
notion that your incJi,·idualitv is partlv constitu ted by your relation to 
others; that is, the value societv places on what you do is not expressed 
solelv as a transaction, but as a relationship. 
\Vhat strikes me is that, in many ways, the alternative consciousness is 
the consciousness of the artist. It is also the consciousness of the profes­
sional. If this were a con fere n ce of lawvers or teachers and there were 
lawvers and teachers in the room, I could make the same analysis. Tradi­
tionall v, the professions are in ner-c!irectecl, more tenuously connected to 
the market, and so forth. I would like to suggest a hypothesis: it is difficult 
and problematic, I think, to make much headway in achieving legitimacy 
in the world for that alternative consciousness for the arts if it is viewed as 
separate from the -.vorld of \\Ork generallv. Galbraith , perhaps for rhetori­
cal purposes, drew a \'(T\' sharp dis<inction between certain tvpes of work. I 
see it more as a ccmin u um. I can de:scri be it with three hypotheses. First, 
the traditional consciousness of work both shapes the law and is reinforced 
bv the law. It's a mutually reinforcing set of ideas. 
Second, we sense or we know, acutelv in some cases, the incornplete­
ness of the traditional consc;ousncss. It fails to describe fu!lv what we do as 
we work, and it produces resuits, human results, that are deeply p;·oblem­
atic-unemplovment, discrimination, low wages, occupational injury , and 
so on. At che same time. it seems ine,·itable; it seems that it is not a simple 
description of realitv. TvVork is an n:change relation; this z's a commodity 
-..vorld; we do rebte tn each other e s sentially as an endless series of negotia­
tions. As a result we are trapped in this dissonance bet\veen dissatisfaction 
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and the inability to see any alternative as other than a romantic fantasy. 
And efforts to act out of an alternative consciousness tend to be captured 
over time by the traditional consciousness, whether those efforts take the 
form of new laws that quickly begin to lose their \'itality , career aspirations, 
or transformational attempts in a job setting. 
Finally, v.·hat I have called an alternative consciousness is not just for 
artists. It's not just for professionals, lawvers, and teachers. There was talk 
this morning about unemployed artists driving taxis. Vv'hat about people 
who drive taxis all the time? They are not artists. But I have heard people 
who work as short-order cooks, for example, talk about what they do at 
9:30 in the morning-slicing tomatoes-as in some vvav an expression of 
their involvement with the people who are going to eat those tomatoes. I 
suggest that the real task is to envision the wavs that all of us, including 
those of us who are not artists, have within us this dissonance. vVe h ave 
within us a set of work norms that in some sense seems inevitable, but that 
in another sense is forced on us as part of the traditional consciousness. 
Theodore Bike! 's storv about the Bureau of Labor statistics and the 
unemployment ligures is true for thousands of people besides artists. There 
are literally thousands of people. whether they are cab driYers or teachers, 
working at so methi ng less than vvhat thev want to do. Of course, that fact 
does not end the matter. Sure. a lot of people would like to he president of 
the United States; they are not all unemployed simplY beetuse the position 
is not open,just as the fact that there is more to the util itv ofvour work than 
the market does not mean that vve all define the utilit\· of our jobs. vVe 
don't; it is more complex than that. But there are mzmy, many people 
caught in t he situation of the unemployed artist dri'.'ing a cab who is told 
that he is no longer an unc mploved artist, he is an empiO\ecl cab driver. 
i;Vhethcr we look at the aspect of the art world being discussed this 
morning or more broad lv at the arts, as the world e':ol•:n the traditional 
consciousness tends to ;ake over, even in those areas like the professions 
where it is the last place to be felt. Certainly. in law and in teaching. the 
bureaucratization and ''proletarianization·' of those profes�ions are pro­
ceeding apa c e . I \\aS interested to find this conference focmed on an aspe ct 
of the arts \\·here this phenomenon seems much less true. I 21m sure that 
there arc other areas of the arts -.vhere it is true. :-hose of vou who fo!lmv 
legal issues know thai recen tly the Supreme Court of the' Cnited States, in 
the Yesh iua Unic·ersi�v case, told teachers they -..Yere not ern plovees at all 
because they had discretion O'.-er their -work that employees tvpically do not 
hm·e. In othe r words, because thev had som e  or the ingredients of self­
clire c::ion that J ha\·e associated with the alterna�i\e consc iousness , the 
Coun said thev were not e mplovees , causing then: to lose protection under 
the Labor Relations Acr. The Court said that a professor has independem 
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j udgment because it is the universi ty 's  policy, in its self-in terest , t o h ire 
people on that basis.  In o t her wo rds , as a teacher I have indepe n dence of 
judgmen t  because t h e  u n iversity vvan t s  me to have it. That was n ews to me , 
and it was n o t  exactly reassu rin g .  It is also interesting t hat in calling me an 
independent professional, the court vvas n o t  raisin g  my status but  was tak­
ing awav a legal righ t . one I mav or may n o t  have wanted , bu t w h ich I 
otherwise would have had. It has doubtless been the inc reasin g  bureaucra­
cization, the decl i n i ng au tonomy of professions l ik e  teaching t hat has led to 
such de\·elopmen ts as unio n i zation. The view t hat t h e  professions are dif­
ferent is expressed t o  make people in t hose fields mo re vulnerable t o  tech­
n ological and societal c hanges that are making t h e  differe nces less real. 
So the  task that I see for us, penetratin g t he limi tat i o ns of the t radi­
t ional co nsciousness in attempt ing to construct legal principles that  are 
respo nsive to something broader , is one that t h e  fiel d of the arts is cent ral 
t o .  but t h at goes far bevond i t. 
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